



Security Council

Sixty-third year

Provisional

5922nd meeting

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New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Khalilzad	(United States of America)
<i>Members:</i>	Belgium	Mr. Grauls
	Burkina Faso	Mr. Kafando
	China	Mr. Liu Zhenmin
	Costa Rica	Mr. Urbina
	Croatia	Mr. Viločić
	France	Mr. Ripert
	Indonesia	Mr. Natalegawa
	Italy	Mr. Spatafora
	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Mr. Ettalhi
	Panama	Mr. Arias
	Russian Federation	Mr. Dolgov
	South Africa	Mr. Kumalo
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir John Sawers
	Viet Nam	Mr. Hoang Chi Trung

Agenda

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

The President: In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Jan Eliasson, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Darfur.

It is so decided.

I invite Mr. Eliasson to take a seat at the Council table.

In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Special Envoy of the African Union for Darfur.

It is so decided.

I invite Mr. Salim to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by Mr. Jan Eliasson, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Darfur, and by Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Special Envoy of the African Union for Darfur.

I now give the floor to Mr. Eliasson.

Mr. Eliasson: It is an honour and a pleasure for me to address the Council today, together with my colleague and dear friend, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, the African Union (AU) Special Envoy for Darfur. As members may be aware, we also briefed the African Union Peace and Security Council jointly on 12 June in Addis Ababa. The fact that we are holding these briefings together is an indication of the ever closer cooperation between the United Nations and the AU, in the spirit of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

Darfur is a case in point. The complexity and scope of the conflict make it even more essential that we strengthen regional and international collaboration. The visit of the Security Council to several African States, including the Sudan, only three weeks ago, is an important manifestation of this growingly important dimension of international relations.

Today, I will provide an overview of the political process and the search for peace in Darfur. As members will recall, in November 2006 at the Addis Ababa high level consultations on Darfur, there was a unanimous call for a re-energized political process. The Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006 was not welcomed or accepted by a majority of Darfurians. There was also a clear need to bring the fragmented non-signatory movements together and to prepare the parties for substantive talks. By December 2006, Mr. Salim and I were appointed as Special Envoys with this task at hand.

At my first briefing to this Council, in March 2007, I reported a sense of deep fatigue and deep frustration on all sides, following four years of conflict and suffering in Darfur. I cautioned, however, that there were voices advocating status quo or a military solution. Furthermore, I expressed concern over the gravity of the humanitarian and security conditions on the ground.

Still, at that time, Mr. Salim and I felt that there was a window of opportunity, a potential for dialogue between the parties. We noted a certain readiness among them to engage in the political process. Conditions on the international and regional fronts seemed relatively favourable at that time. Momentum was being built toward the deployment of a joint AU-United Nations peacekeeping operation. During this period, we developed the roadmap for the political process, presented to this Council in June last year. The aim was to convene substantive talks by the end of last summer.

Over the past 18 months, Mr. Salim and I have urged the parties to prove their serious intentions, notably by improving the security and humanitarian situation. There was a need to build confidence and an environment conducive to peace talks. We travelled numerous times to movement-controlled areas of Darfur and to locations in the region, and urged the movements to build internal cohesion. We urged them to adopt an issue-based approach and to focus on common concerns in the areas of power-sharing,

wealth-sharing and security. We strongly advised them to come to the negotiation table with unified positions.

We also met frequently in Khartoum and Juba with officials of the Government of National Unity, and urged them to show preparedness and make compromises in order to speed up the political process. We requested them to exercise political and military restraint. Also, we urged them to discuss with us how the issues of power- and wealth- sharing, as well as security could be dealt with at the talks.

During all this time, we visited over-populated refugee camps and internally displaced person camps on the ground. We sat under the trees with traditional leaders and we walked through many local, tragically empty, markets. We saw with our own eyes and felt with our own hearts why Darfur to many is considered forgotten and neglected. To all the people we saw, we had the same message and were met with the same response: it is time for a serious peace process which brings an end to the suffering, an end to political marginalization, an end to socio-economic inequality and an end to the climate of insecurity and fear prevalent today in Darfur.

Last summer, the atmosphere was positive. The Security Council had adopted resolution 1769 (2007). There had been no reported cease fire violations for four months. Most movements had indicated that they would be ready to start negotiations by the end of the summer. Despite continuing fragmentation among them, progress was made, notably in Arusha, Tanzania, in August 2007, when their leading personalities agreed on a common platform for the talks.

Based on these developments, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Chairperson Konaré decided to launch the first phase of the formal peace talks in Sirte, Libya, in October. While the tone of the exchanges between the parties was constructive, the absence of key movements and of a consolidated National Unity Government delegation made it extremely difficult to engage in substantive discussions. The conditions were just not ripe. The start of a peace process was, however, a catalyst for the movements to intensify their unification efforts, not least assisted by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Juba. Mr. Salim and I were encouraged by the work done to restructure the tangled web of smaller groups. We saw the emergence of five main groupings: the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Unity, the United Resistance

Front (URF), SLA-Abdul Shafie, SLA-Abdul Wahid and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)-Khalil Ibrahim.

Unfortunately, the willingness of the movements to embark on the road to peace has over time not been consistent. SLA-Abdul Wahid continues to place severe pre-conditions for participation in the talks. JEM-Khalil Ibrahim has pursued the military track and has been met with international criticism for doing so. Both these movements have also refused participation in the talks if what they call "splinter movements" were to take part. The URF and SLM-Abdul Shafie are basically positive to the process but are still working to resolve internal problems. SLA-Unity has been cooperative and declared itself ready to attend talks at any time.

In the beginning of last fall, JEM split and SPLM suspended its work in the Government. Since then, the environment has continued to deteriorate. The incursions and stand-off between Chad and Sudan have underscored the urgent need for good neighbourly relations between them. The attack on Omdurman proved that there are those who still believe in a military solution. The destruction in Abyei showed the lingering North-South tensions in Sudan and the consequences of unimplemented agreements. Continued clashes in Darfur between the movements and the Sudan Armed Forces and among tribal militias make it clear that this intractable conflict is still unfolding.

To this should be added continued violence and dire humanitarian conditions on the ground. Humanitarian access is constrained by fighting between the movements and between them and the Government's armed forces. Access and security have been further curtailed by attacks on humanitarian workers and assets, by banditry, by looting and even by abductions and murders. This has taken a heavy toll on humanitarian operations, not least on the delivery of food which the World Food Programme (WFP) has had to substantially diminish. High food prices globally and the impending rainy season give further reasons for alarm.

The security situation in Darfur should now be our primary concern. In accordance with our framework for the way forward, presented this spring, Mr. Salim and I have, for a few months now, placed strong emphasis on reducing the level of violence. As a part of these efforts, we had extensive contacts with the

parties on convening informal security consultations between the movements and the Government of Sudan in Switzerland earlier this month.

In the end, JEM and SLM-Abdul Wahid chose not to agree to meet for such consultations at this time. For that and other reasons, we decided to postpone. Meanwhile, we continue to discuss security with the parties on a bilateral basis.

Against this background, it is with much regret that I report today that we are in a troubled state of affairs in the political process. Since the Sirte talks, the parties have not been willing to come together for substantive talks. Mr. Salim and I have not sensed a prevailing willingness on the part of the parties to engage in confidence-building measures so as to improve prospects for negotiations. Trust among them has not been established and is in some cases completely absent.

Fragmentation within the movements continues to affect their cohesion and preparedness for talks. Instead of coming together around issues that would facilitate the process and improve the lives of generations of Darfurians, some of the movements have been engaged in power struggles and in-fighting. They have been preoccupied with formulating preconditions for talks and using rhetoric often distant from reality. The original movements, SLA-Abdul Wahid and JEM-Khalil Ibrahim, claim to be more legitimate than the other groups. Thus, they should, in my view, accept responsibility, exercise leadership and promote cooperation with the other movements.

At the same time, we must recognize that the movements have great and genuine lack of trust in the Government of Sudan. They seriously doubt that there will be a fair implementation of a peace accord. They look at the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Darfur Peace Agreement as examples of why not to come to the negotiation table. Continued attacks against civilians and resettlement on land owned by people now languishing in the camps do not foster an atmosphere of confidence. Let us also remember that it is first and foremost the Government of Sudan that has the resources and responsibility to ensure protection, prosperity and a life of dignity for all the people of Darfur and Sudan.

Mr. Salim and I have thus called several times upon the Government to exercise maximum restraint and be forthcoming on key issues of the conflict in

order concretely to demonstrate its commitment to a political solution. Further, for trust to be established, for a credible political process to be made possible and for reconciliation to occur, respect for human rights and the rule of law is crucial.

I often ask myself why the conflict in Darfur is so difficult to resolve. I have come to the conclusion that it is because it requires simultaneous harmony at four levels: the international community; the regional partners; the Government of National Unity of Sudan; and, finally, the movements in Darfur. Such harmony has, over time and in varying degrees, been conspicuously absent.

It is now crucial that influential players from the international community explore and analyse their comparative advantages vis-à-vis the parties and the region. To make progress, all must accept responsibility. A much more efficient division of labour is required in dealing with this crisis. There is an urgent need for outside actors — international organizations, Member States and especially members of this Council — to jointly exert influence, as well as use bilateral leverage on the parties to stop further hostilities and take steps towards peace. A well-prepared high-level international meeting could play a positive catalyst role in that respect.

To succeed, we must also look at Darfur through the broader lens of Sudan as a whole, as well as of the region. In so doing, we should keep the following considerations in mind.

First, the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement obviously has far-reaching implications for Darfur. This is true in terms of confidence-building, but also for future power-sharing arrangements in Darfur and Sudan.

Secondly, there will be no peace in Darfur without a normalization of relations between Sudan and Chad. Concerted efforts are required to assist and influence both countries to re-establish security and to live up to existing agreements, the most recent of which is the Dakar Accord.

Thirdly, peace will require political will and a willingness from the parties to compromise. This also requires that key international and regional actors come up with more credible diplomatic, financial and socio-economic incentives and disincentives, including

recovery programmes in places where conditions are stable.

Fourthly, there must be a more rapid and effective deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The implementation of resolution 1769 (2007) is critical for the credibility of the international community and for this Council and for the security and well-being of the people of Darfur. The international community has demonstrated solidarity with Darfur through the brave men and women offered to UNAMID from many nations. At the same time, I must say that hand-picking eligible nationalities for a peacekeeping operation is hardly consistent with the spirit of the United Nations Charter, and it certainly complicates the peace process.

Fifthly, the quest for peace will always be obstructed when there is an abundance of arms. More effective efforts must be made to end the arms flow to Darfur, in accordance with the United Nations embargo.

Finally, the people of Darfur must be much more actively engaged in the process. We should recall resolution 1325 (2000) when we see that women and children suffer the most. Ordinary citizens and internally displaced persons have carried a heavy burden and have already paid a huge price. Any future agreement will be stillborn unless civil society, traditional leaders and representatives from the displaced communities know that their voices are heard. Their interests — and not only those who have taken up arms — must be respected. In this regard, Mr. Salim and I welcome the recent commitment by the Government to a stronger engagement with civil society in Darfur.

I would like to conclude with a few personal reflections. I often quote the old Swedish saying that you can bring a horse to the waterhole, but you cannot force a horse to drink. In the case of Darfur, there is now reason to seriously question whether the parties are ready to sit down at the negotiation table and make the compromises necessary for peace. Mr. Salim and I have tried our best to assist them. The appointment of a full-time joint United Nations-African Union chief mediator to continue in this quest is now imminent. The name is to be announced as soon as the parties have been informed. Mr. Salim and I will remain available for advice and engagement as need be.

However, the appointment of a chief mediator will, in itself, of course, not bring peace to Darfur. As mentioned, others must contribute by providing more enticing incentives and more credible disincentives to the parties. That may require a shift in mindset in how the main protagonists and we all view the crisis. There has been a tendency to compartmentalize the conflict in Darfur, without taking sufficient account of the national and regional dimensions.

The outside world, as much as the parties, has a responsibility to bring an end to this tragedy. It risks tearing apart a great nation of Africa, seriously destabilizing the region and endangering international peace and security. For over five years, millions of people have suffered enormously. This simply cannot go on. A new generation in Sudan may be doomed to a life in conflict, a life in despair and a life in poverty. The international community should have learned enough lessons from other conflicts in which populations were left to stagnate and radicalize in camps.

Therefore, we must now urgently mobilize all available political energy inside and outside Sudan to, first of all, stop escalation and reach a cessation of hostilities and, secondly, lay a foundation for serious peace talks for Darfur. But, at the end of the day, we will not make progress unless the Sudanese themselves show seriousness, political will and a focused commitment to peace. It is for them to accept responsibility and finally settle the outstanding issues that for so long have plagued the people of Darfur and the people of Sudan.

The President: I thank Mr. Eliasson for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Salim.

Mr. Salim: I am honoured to have this opportunity to address the Security Council. I am particularly pleased, Sir, to do so under your presidency. I am aware of the significant efforts made by your country in the search for an end to the conflict in Darfur and the achievement of a just and durable settlement. I am particularly conscious of the active support given to both my colleague and friend Jan Eliasson and me by the United States and other international partners in the discharge of our mandate as Special Envoys of the United Nations and the African Union on Darfur.

I am not a stranger to the Security Council as far as the issue of Darfur is concerned. During the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on Darfur held in Abuja in 2005

and 2006, during which I was the African Union Special Envoy and Chief Mediator and which culminated in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement, I had occasions to brief the Council. This time, however, I do so jointly with Special Envoy Eliasson, manifesting our teamwork and eloquently displaying in practical terms the growing cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union in our collective quest for peace and security and, more specifically, in our collective determination to contribute to ending the tragic conflict in Darfur. As Mr. Eliasson rightly observed, 12 days ago both of us had the opportunity to brief the African Union Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa.

In his presentation today, Special Envoy Eliasson has given a detailed and elaborate account of our joint activities. Those include intensive consultations, road maps, work plans, programmes and strategies that the Special Envoys, assisted by the Joint Mediation Support Team, put in place, with the full support of regional and international players, aimed at bringing the parties in conflict to the negotiation table. I fully share what he has said.

Sixteen months ago, the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission entrusted us with a specific mandate, namely, to re-energize the political process. In other words, we were to create propitious conditions for the parties in conflict — that is to say, the Government of the Sudan and the armed movements — to engage in a more inclusive political dialogue leading to a more acceptable, and therefore more durable, political settlement of the Darfur problem. During this period, we travelled many times to Sudan. In particular, we visited Khartoum, Darfur and Juba.

In Darfur we visited extensively several different areas to meet with the leaders and commanders of the armed movements. During those visits we consulted extensively with stakeholders, including signatories and non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement, traditional leaders, leaders of political parties, representatives of internally displaced persons, civil society organizations, women's and youth groups and intellectuals. One of the shortcomings of the Abuja Peace Talks was to confine the entire process to the Government and the armed movements. This time, we were determined to rectify that by ensuring that the broadest range of stakeholders were involved, or at the very least consulted.

In Khartoum, during our consultations with Government leaders and officials at various levels, while welcoming the Government's preparedness to enter into negotiations, we urged them to take concrete measures to allay the concerns and fears of the movements, which have a very deep distrust of the Government. We underscored the fact that the Government has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of security, and consequently should take deliberate and sustained steps aimed at de-escalating violence, including exercising restraint and refraining from aerial bombardments, which invariably have terrible consequences on innocent civilians. We also urged the Government to be more proactive and flexible on the fundamental issues that constitute the current divide between them and the movements in respect of the future dispensation of Darfur.

In Juba, we also met on several occasions with top leaders and officials. We supported and encouraged their efforts aimed at promoting the unity of the movements. We did so because, first, we believe that, as part of the Government of National Unity, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) can, and should, play an important and constructive role in the achievement of a just and lasting settlement of the Darfur crisis. Secondly, we believe that the SPLM's own experience and its historic relations with some of the movements in Darfur would be helpful in encouraging them towards the process of negotiations.

We spent a considerable part of our time, energy and the limited resources at the disposal of the joint mediation encouraging and supporting efforts by the movements aimed at bringing about unity, or at the very least the attainment of common positions. We did so in the firm belief that such unity would contribute immensely to the peace process and that, conversely, continued fragmentation was inimical to peace and stability in Darfur. In our efforts and initiatives we interacted and consulted closely with regional partners. We also had the support of international partners.

The Arusha consultations in August 2007 provided a ray of hope. Regrettably, however, that optimism was shattered with the division that occurred within the leadership of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) soon thereafter. Subsequent to the commencement of the Sirte process in October last year, and drawing from the lessons of Sirte, which, inter alia, necessitated the postponement of the talks due to the absence of some of the major players, efforts

were intensified aimed at forging some degree of unity and cohesion. The emergence of five groups — instead of having to deal with about two dozen factions or so — is to be welcomed. Of course, ideally we would have liked to have the situation that prevailed at the beginning of the Abuja Talks, namely, only the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement. Regrettably, however, for the present that remains a mere ideal. Furthermore, it is important to recall that the process of fragmentation within the movements started in earnest while the Abuja Talks were still taking place.

The reality on the ground is therefore that there is still division among the movements, and in some instances within them. Another sad reality is that some of the movements are not prepared, or are unwilling, not only to enter into substantive negotiations but are even against taking part in any formal or informal talks. Some insist on preconditions that are clearly unacceptable, even though some of their legitimate demands as such should form a basis for negotiations. Others claim an exclusive monopoly on representation and are dismissive of all other movements. Still others seem to vigorously pursue a military option, as manifested by JEM's unfortunate attack on Omdurman, which has drawn universal international condemnation.

To compound the situation, the process of fragmentation has not been completely halted. In short, the political process has reached an impasse and, as it was stressed in a meeting we held with regional and international partners earlier this month in Geneva, there is a need to rethink the strategy on the way forward. As the Security Council reflects on this rather gloomy picture and considers the way forward, I believe it is important to take into consideration the following factors, among others.

The number one concern of Darfurians — as eloquently expressed to us whenever we met with them, in towns or villages, whether in Government areas or in rebel strongholds — is the question of security. There is fighting involving the Sudanese armed forces and some of the movements. There is fighting between some movements themselves. There is the terror that continues to be unleashed by the Janjaweed. And there is the sheer banditry and criminality perpetrated by some armed groups. It is indeed no exaggeration to assert that Darfurians in general have been eagerly waiting the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in

Darfur (UNAMID), and have great expectations that its full deployment will make a great difference in their daily lives. Such a deployment will certainly go a long way in helping to create a favourable climate for the launching of the peace process.

It is therefore all the more regrettable that such a deployment has been agonizingly slow in the face of numerous difficulties, some due to the position of the Government of the Sudan on such matters as the composition of the force and others due to the failure of the international community to act decisively. We all recognize that what is needed in Darfur is a robust, well-equipped force with a reasonable mobile capacity. In this connection, I believe that it is a sad commentary that notwithstanding the existence of thousands of helicopters it has not yet been possible to obtain two dozen or so helicopters for UNAMID. And yet the international community at large has repeatedly called for the rapid deployment of a robust UNAMID.

Given these circumstances, it is, in our opinion, important to be vigilant so that the euphoria of expectation among Darfurians does not yield to despondency. At the same time it is evident that UNAMID per se, even when fully deployed with the necessary equipment and logistical backup, will not translate into peace and stability in Darfur. The hybrid force will need the cooperation of all the parties in order to effectively discharge its responsibilities. Above all, it will need a peace to keep; hence the crucial importance of the political process.

The situation of insecurity in Darfur is made worse by the tense and deteriorating relations between Chad and the Sudan. In the interests of the peoples of both Chad and the Sudan, it is crucial that this situation be defused. The various accords reached between the two countries, including the latest one agreed upon in Dakar, cry out for implementation. Clearly, without the reduction of tension between these two neighbours and the normalization of relations, it is inconceivable that there can be a lasting solution to the conflict in Darfur.

Another issue of grave concern which requires urgent attention and action is the flow of arms into Darfur despite the existence of an arms embargo. The Security Council should look into this and should close whatever loopholes exist.

On 16 November 2006 a high-level meeting involving a number of States and institutions, including the representatives of the Government of the Sudan and

the representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council, was held at the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Abba. That meeting was jointly chaired by the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, and the then African Union Commission Chairperson, President Alpha Oumar Konare. It decided on a number of key issues including re-energizing the political process and the creation of an African Union-United Nations hybrid force. In Geneva, in June, a proposal was made and generally accepted, subject to appropriate preparations, recommending the holding of a high-level meeting to be convened by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and AU Commission Chairperson Jean Ping to chart the way forward. It is recommended that the participants at the meeting should include the Foreign Ministers of the permanent members of the Security Council, representatives of the Government of the Sudan and regional and international partners. Given the current situation in Darfur, with its repercussions in the whole of the Sudan and in the region, this proposal, in our opinion, merits serious follow-up so that it can be realized as soon as possible. As a new approach is required in dealing with this crisis, such a meeting would provide a unique opportunity for reflection, consideration and possible action.

Given the enormity of the challenges that lie ahead, the need to have someone following events on daily basis and engaging the parties on a more regular basis is self-evident. That is why Jan Eliasson and I very much look forward to the appointment of a common AU-United Nations chief mediator, who will be based in Khartoum. He will need the active support of the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council. He will certainly have the full support of the two Special Envoys and the Joint Mediation Support Team. Even more crucially, however, he will need the support of the Government of the Sudan and the movements. In the meantime, it is important to underscore the need for both the United Nations Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council to be actively engaged in the process and to send the right signals and strong messages to the parties. They should encourage those who support the peace process and effectively discourage all those who constitute an obstacle to peace.

It is now five years since the armed conflict erupted in Darfur. These have been five very difficult years for the people of Darfur, who have seen tens of

thousands of their compatriots, including their wives and husbands, their mothers and fathers, their children and grandchildren, killed or maimed and millions more displaced in camps for internally displaced persons or as refugees. The challenge before the United Nations and the African Union is how to put an end to this catastrophic conflict, contribute to lasting peace and thereby enable the Darfurians to live in dignity, free of constant threats to their lives. Peace, security and stability in Darfur are crucial not only for the people of that western region of the Sudan but for the Sudan as a whole, inasmuch as the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is vital for the entire country.

Equally challenging is the task of reducing tension in the region and promoting normal relations. The international community, and more particularly those countries and institutions with comparative advantages, should use their influence with the Sudan and the region to assist in the efforts to end the conflict and promote peace, security and development. But ultimately, the responsibility is that of the Sudanese people themselves.

The President: I thank Mr. Salim for his briefing.

I shall now call on Council members wishing to make statements.

Mr. Ettalhi (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I am pleased to welcome Mr. Jan Eliasson and Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim to the Council and to thank them for their briefings. We are highly appreciative of their endeavours in discharging their complex and difficult — but noble and lofty — mandates.

It is regrettable that the security situation in Darfur has deteriorated during the period under consideration, as attested to by this morning's briefings, by the reports of the Secretary-General and by what internally displaced persons (IDPs) and humanitarian workers told the Security Council mission during its visit to Darfur.

The 10 May action by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), targeting the capital, and the ongoing violence among tribal groups, rebel movements and the Government underscore the need to accelerate the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and to

ensure that it has the capacity necessary to protect civilians, in particular those in IDP camps, and humanitarian workers. The number of IDPs grows by the day, which regrettably means an increased number of people in need of assistance and protection.

But there has been a delay, if not a disruption, in the deployment of UNAMID, due in large part to the mission's considerable shortfall in equipment. For example, as the report indicates, the deployment of the first Egyptian battalion has been delayed owing to the absence of necessary equipment. The same is true for the Ethiopian battalion. Be they Egyptian or Ethiopian, these troops are prepared to be deployed in Darfur. Yet the camps were not ready to receive them, thereby impeding their arrival. In addition, the Nepalese and Thai troops were also late to arrive.

We listened to the Sudanese officials whom we met during our visit expressing their unqualified cooperation in the deployment of the hybrid force. Because the deployment of the hybrid force is clearly in the interest of the Sudanese Government and, more broadly, in the interest of stability and peace, we expect that the Sudanese Government, together with the Mission, will constitute a joint team to overcome all the problems standing in the way of the deployment. The Sudanese officials clearly expressed their willingness to operate the airports in the Darfur region on a continuous 24-hour basis, although that required overcoming technical deficiencies and completing the unfinished airport infrastructure to enable them to receive the aircraft deployed for the mission. In this regard, paragraph 29 of the report contained in document S/2006/400 deserves special attention. It reads as follows:

“Despite ongoing efforts, critical mission capabilities are still lacking, namely, 18 medium utility helicopters, six attack helicopters, one aerial reconnaissance unit, one medium transport unit, one heavy transport unit and one multi-role logistics unit.”

Once again, the mission is regrettably still facing deficiencies that hamper its deployment.

All of us know that success in deploying the hybrid Mission depends on providing for its requirements so that it can discharge its tasks. That is a sine qua non, a precondition to ameliorate the humanitarian and security conditions in Darfur and to improve the chances for success of the political process.

Participants at the Geneva meeting on 5 June under the chairmanship of the two mediators expressed their disappointment over the late deployment of the force as well as the adverse consequences resulting therefrom on the political process. The two mediators emphasized this fact in the Council this morning as well.

It is regrettable that, despite the efforts deployed, particularly by the two Envoys, Mr. Jan Eliasson and Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, the political process has not achieved even a modicum of progress; rather, it has deteriorated. Some rebel movements refuse to join the political process. Further, they insist on continuing the violence, despite the fact that the Sudanese Government expressed its readiness to engage in dialogue and hastened to declare a unilateral ceasefire, as mentioned at the launching of the Sirte negotiations.

We believe that greater attention must be directed by this Council to the political process, in addition to supporting the efforts made by the two Envoys, providing propitious circumstances for the launching of the peace process. In our estimation, that requires the following steps. First, there must be an attempt to achieve Sudanese-Chadian reconciliation through the support of the efforts of the contact group that was formed as a result of the Dakar Agreement. On that score, I agree with Mr. Salim about the impossibility of achieving peace in Darfur if there is no Sudanese-Chadian reconciliation.

Secondly, persons and groups that refuse to accede to the peace process or seek to achieve a ceasefire with the current measures should be targeted. The Council has hesitated a great deal on this point. Some movements have refused even to engage in mere participation in designated security consultations despite the efforts of the two international mediators and the specific appeals made to them. It would also be useful for the peace process to offer incentives to those who are taking positive stands.

Thirdly, greater attention to and support for civil society and the traditional leadership are also important. Unfortunately, we have to acknowledge that traditional tribal leaders have tremendous influence, greatly exceeding that of the political leadership. We believe that civil society and the traditional leadership are more eager to achieve peace, stability and security. That is the reality in tribal societies.

Fourthly, we are in full agreement with the observations made by the participants in Geneva, namely that the continued flow of arms to Darfur unfortunately persists. It is therefore important to redress this matter urgently and effectively.

In conclusion, I agree with Mr. Eliasson's statement on the need to agree to the six points he raised. That will undoubtedly have a considerable effect on advancing the peace process.

Sir John Sawers (United Kingdom): I would like to add my very warm thanks to Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim for their efforts over the past 18 months. Their statements today had something of the flavour of a valedictory report, and we very much welcome the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a joint chief mediator for the United Nations and the African Union in the days ahead; he briefed the Council on this point yesterday. We welcome this move and we fully understand that the role of the two Special Envoys will change and retreat a little bit. After the 18 months of labouring in the Darfur vineyard, eating the sour grapes and drinking the undrinkable wine, that decision is fully understandable.

The Security Council visit, as my good friend Ambassador Ettlhi has said, was quite revealing for us all in terms of the real difficulties on the ground in Darfur, in Khartoum and also in Chad. We came to many of the same gloomy conclusions that the two Special Envoys have reported to the Council today. We briefed the Council on our findings, but I think it is very striking that the six factors that Mr. Jan Eliasson have identified are very similar to some of the factors that we focused on as well.

I would like to take those six considerations in turn, keeping in mind that they overlap extensively with what Mr. Salim said in his own report.

First of all, I think it is quite right to put the centrality of the peace agreement first, even in discussion on Darfur. It was very clear to us all in Sudan that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is the cornerstone of peace in the Sudan. If the CPA founders, then there is no hope in the short term or the medium term for progress elsewhere. We have to do everything we can to keep the CPA on track, and the United Nations can do more in that respect. The events in Abyei just a few weeks ago showed that the role of the United Nations presence, the United Nations force on the ground, could be more active and could be more

involved in preventing the sorts of clashes which led to the forced displacement of up to 60,000 people and the razing to the ground of one of the main towns of southern Sudan.

Secondly, it was clear in visiting both Sudan and Chad on consecutive days that the situations on either side of the border are intimately linked. The Council has vehemently condemned the attacks by the Justice and Equality Movement into the suburbs of Khartoum. It has also condemned the attacks by Chad rebels towards N'Djamena. The fact is that rebels on each side are backed by the other's Government. We have to be very clear that the international presence on the ground cannot be used as a shield behind which Governments in Khartoum and N'Djamena make the Council's goals in Khartoum more difficult to achieve. I believe the focus that the two Special Envoys have placed today on the centrality of establishing stable and good neighbourly relations between the Sudan and Chad is absolutely fundamental, because without that we are not going to make progress in Darfur.

Thirdly, I was struck by what Mr. Eliasson said about incentives and disincentives as being clearly insufficient. This does not mean that we simply reach for more sanctions, but we do have to consider whether sanctions are not part of the mix against those who are obstructing the peace process. We must also consider what incentives we can offer to both parties to engage. At the moment, they are not sufficient.

Fourthly, Mr. Eliasson focused on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The Secretary-General has spoken of a target of 80 per cent deployment by the year's end. We all know that UNAMID has been bedevilled in its first year by the gap between the commitments the parties have made and the reality. There is a gap in the provision by the international community of key units, which we need to continue to address. There is a gap on the United Nations side in building up the capacity, as my Libyan colleague identified, to receive new units on the ground. Here, the United Nations has not done as much as it could. There is a gap on the Sudanese side where there is much talk about cooperation, but, as we saw on the ground, the reality is continued low-level difficulties and, at times, obstruction. UNAMID is not going to be the single way to solve this problem in Darfur, but is a crucial element which we need to get right.

Fifthly, Mr. Eliasson focused on the arms embargo. It is very striking when one is in Darfur that any local thug with some money can buy a pick-up truck, some rocket-propelled grenades and kalashnikov rifles and turn himself into a militia. We need to address this free availability of weapons in Darfur if we are to solve this problem. That means that all members of this Council have to do more to address the seriousness of the arms embargo that we have placed on Darfur and to make sure that we do not idly sell weapons which just happen to find their way there. We are responsible for ensuring that weapons do not reach Darfur. We may need to look at an extension of the scope of the arms embargo if we are to address this problem. That is one thing that needs to be on the table.

Sixthly, Mr. Eliasson focused on the people of Darfur. I believe the efforts to bring together civil society, community groups, traditional leaders and tribal elders in Darfur are crucial. Too often the negotiations on Darfur are seen as negotiations between militias, whereas it is actually the people who have to live together — they have lived together there for centuries and they need to continue to live together, albeit in stressful circumstances. If we can generate an understanding from the bottom up, this will be a crucial part of our efforts. The United Kingdom stands ready to play a role to bring the parties together if and when that would make a helpful contribution.

Lastly, one factor that Mr. Eliasson did not mention is the question of impunity. After we were in Darfur, the Security Council went to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which knows about the problem of impunity. President Kabila said that one cannot put justice aside and hope for a durable peace. That applies as much in Darfur as it does in the Congo and elsewhere in Africa.

So it is with these thoughts that I wanted to imply that the Council has some very serious and difficult business ahead on Sudan. It will remain the most demanding topic on our agenda. I would say, once again, how grateful we are for the efforts of Mr. Salim and Mr. Eliasson over the last 18 months in trying to move this dossier forward, and we are glad that they remain available and on-call should we need their services again in the future.

Mr. Kumalo (South Africa): Thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this meeting. Let me also welcome the Special Envoys, Mr. Jan Eliasson, whom I

choose to remember in his capacity as President of the General Assembly, and, of course, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, who will forever be associated with the Organization of African Unity, now known as the African Union (AU).

I must say at the outset that, having been to Darfur, I admire the fact that these two Special Envoys were able to go there over and over again to try to assist the people of Darfur. In fact, I would like to say that those who always wonder what is wrong in Darfur and what can be done probably should spend time studying the two statements delivered to us today. Although we left Darfur a while ago, I am still concerned that the people in Darfur are crying for Darfur. I sometimes wonder whether we can address their cries. We all say that the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) should be at full strength, but we should also be aware that, even if UNAMID was deployed at full capacity, it cannot be a substitute for dialogue and political negotiations. Without the political process, one would need 200,000 soldiers and perhaps 100 helicopters in the air at all times. Certainly, we should call for helicopters, which are so sorely needed in Darfur; but without the political process, one would need to keep those helicopters in the air for 24 hours a day to give any kind of assurance to the people of Darfur, who are exposed, not only to the elements of nature, but to the violence that can come from every imaginable direction and from every imaginable source. We in South Africa remain very committed to trying to find a durable solution to the situation in Darfur, one of whose very important pillars is the political process. We pay tribute to what Mr. Eliasson and Mr. Salim have done in trying to re-energize the peace process.

I was very struck by my visit to Sudan. Before I went there, I thought there were basically two movements, one called the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and one called the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and those were really the two movements, with, of course, splinter factions from those two. But among everyone that I talked to in Sudan, no one ever believed that JEM was really serious about Darfur. First Vice-President Salva Kiir said that JEM has always had the goal of regime change. They are more worried about changing the Government in Khartoum.

It is not been surprising that JEM, which was of course roundly condemned by all of us for their attack

on Omdurman, is viewed by all those who know about them as not having their hearts in Darfur. Darfur is a good halfway station for them, because Darfur comes with publicity and the world's attention.

That raises the question that I would like to ask both Special Envoys, through you, Mr. President. The Envoys were very diplomatic, saying that we should put pressure on them. But what about taking serious measures against these people? What about putting pressure on them? Of course, it is easy to put pressure on the Government, because they are there, but these guys are operating out of the back of their pickup trucks. What about finding ways to also put pressure on them? Some of them live in Europe, so we can get to them if we want to. I am not saying we should not put pressure on the Government. But I am trying to ask: what is the way in which we could also apply pressure to these people?

Based on the statements we have just heard, I want to say a small prayer for the chief mediator who will be appointed, because expecting the mediator that the Secretary-General will appoint to go into this situation and to do better than these very seasoned international civil servants in front of us is asking too much. We must provide tools that the international community is going to use to assist the mediator in doing his work. Otherwise, the only difference between this person who will be appointed and Mr. Salim and Mr. Eliasson will be that he or she will be based in Khartoum and will be there all the time. But if we are going to deal with some of these people, who are so well-described here, maybe we need to say something about how that should happen.

At the same time, with regard to the political process — and I realize that this is not the meeting for that, but I have said it before and I will say it again — I was very surprised at how inadequately resourced the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is. I told the story about going into a camp in Darfur and listening to the people saying “we need protection” and then going to UNAMID and realizing that we do not have the resources to assist them at this stage. That is why we hope the deployment can speed up as soon as possible.

I am tempted to comment on Mr. Eliasson's four-part harmony, coming from Africa, where we sing without instruments. To really have a good four-part harmony, you must all sing from the same sheet music

or remember the same song. Right now, the four that he mentioned that make up that four-part harmony do not even have the same sheet music among themselves so how can they sing together in four-part harmony?

I agree on the arms embargo and the proliferation of arms in Darfur, but that will also only be addressed if we have all the pieces in place, if we have UNAMID at full strength and if we have a political process under way. That may do it, but right now, when the people of Darfur ask us the difficult question “Can you help us?”, at this moment we should be humble enough to say that we are not yet well enough equipped to help them. We truly want to, but we just are not there yet.

Mr. Liu Zhenmin (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I will be very brief. China thanks Mr. Eliasson and Mr. Salim for their briefings. China has taken note of the fact that the two Special Envoys recently presided over informal consultations on the political process in Darfur in order to pool our collective wisdom to push ahead the political process in the region. China appreciates the tireless efforts made by the two Special Envoys and their teams to resolve the Darfur issue.

The current situation in Darfur leaves no room for optimism, and efforts in all areas face challenges. The international community should continue to follow the dual-track strategy and make full use of the tripartite mechanism, with a focus on pushing the political process forward and ensuring the deployment of peacekeepers.

As pointed out in the Secretary-General's reports, the key to restarting the political process in Darfur lies in the parties' political will to seek a negotiated settlement of their differences. China supports the appointment of a chief mediator to integrate international resources, optimize regional strategies and present a united front to the parties, in particular by sending a clear message to the rebel groups in question and urging them to join the political process at the earliest possible date.

China is deeply concerned over the lack of resources for the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), because substantial funding is available. We hope that the Secretariat will continue to enhance its coordination with the troop-contributing countries and to seek, from the international community, the civil aviation, transportation and engineering contingents that are so badly needed. China welcomes the assistance to the

troop-contributing countries provided by Member States in a position to do so through various means, including in the areas of equipment and training, so as to help the Secretariat in accelerating the deployment of the peacekeeping forces.

The recent security situation in Darfur has severely interfered with the humanitarian relief efforts there. China urges the parties concerned to refrain from attacking international relief organizations and their workers, and to facilitate their work.

With the onset of the rainy season, humanitarian problems resulting from food shortages, blocked roads and rampant banditry will become ever more serious. We hope that this will be given adequate attention by the United Nations.

As always, China will support the United Nations and the African Union in their efforts to resolve the Darfur issue.

Mr. Ripert (France) (*spoke in French*): I too would like to thank the Special Envoys of the Secretary-General and the African Union for their briefings. I commend them for their commitment and tenacity.

The political process that Mr. Jan Eliasson and Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim are trying to bring about is crucial to peace in Darfur. Like all of our colleagues, we call on all the parties to end the violence and engage unconditionally in the political process. That of course applies, first of all, to the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), whose attack in Khartoum in May France and the European Union have condemned. It also applies to the ruling party, which, as the mediators have said here, has carried out indiscriminate attacks against villages in recent months, including aerial bombardments and the use of Janjaweed militias, in spite of the repeated appeals of the Security Council and in flagrant violation of international humanitarian law. Lastly, that also goes for all the other movements in Darfur. For its part, the French Government is continuing its efforts to convince Mr. Abdul Wahid al-Nur to rejoin the peace process. It is true that the task has become more difficult while we await a genuine meeting.

My delegation agrees with the choice of the co-mediators to organize consultations with the movements on security issues. We regret that the holding of those consultations has had to be postponed due to the lack of sufficient participation at this stage.

However, we must break out of the vicious circle into which the political process risks becoming trapped. While that process is coming together, as Mr. Eliasson has said, it is also essential to pursue negotiations with civil society in order to listen to their expectations and not allow those who have taken up arms to be the sole representatives of all Darfurians. Finally, my delegation welcomes the upcoming appointment by the United Nations and the African Union of a joint chief mediator to strengthen the mediation team. The political process is not a separate process detached from other aspects of the crisis. To the contrary, we cannot hope to move the political process forward unless we make progress on the other issues.

The effective deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) continues to be essential and urgent. That United Nations operation has the task of protecting the population and actively monitoring the ceasefire. So long as the operation does not have the sufficient capacity to meet its mandate, the civilian population will continue to live in fear, humanitarian workers will risk their lives on a daily basis and the parties will continue to view each other with suspicion. It is therefore urgent that we strengthen UNAMID. That means that we must have the full cooperation of the Sudanese authorities, which is still lacking. In the meantime, we believe that in no way can UNAMID hesitate to assume its responsibilities, in particular by organizing more secure convoys and by ensuring the safety of road corridors. During the Council's mission, we saw that that task was not impossible.

Combating impunity also continues to be an essential task. How can we persuade the population of Darfur to adhere to their genuine desire to make peace when a person wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity continues to serve in the Government and is in charge of humanitarian affairs? The people of Darfur have the right to justice. Those responsible for the gross violations committed in Darfur must be held accountable. The response of the President of the Sudan to the Security Council mission's request in that regard has been inadequate. In that connection, I should like to reiterate that the European Union has stated its readiness to consider additional measures against those who continue to refuse to cooperate with the International Criminal Court.

As the mediators have said, the proper implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is also an essential element in bringing peace back to Darfur. The Government of National Unity, which was established by virtue of the Agreement, has the primary responsibility to bring about peace in the entire country, and therefore in Darfur as well.

My delegation is pleased to note that the recent crisis in Abyei has been overcome and that the United Nations was able to learn valuable lessons as a consequence. We hope that the north-south process will be strengthened as a result, thereby contributing to establishing the environment for a national agreement on Darfur. At stake is the unity and prosperity of all of the Sudan, to which we are especially committed.

Lastly, regional tensions must be calmed. We welcome the commitment of regional partners, especially that of Libya and the Congo, to follow up the Dakar Accord. It is in the interest of both the Sudan and Chad to re-establish cooperative and good-neighbourly relations. As the Security Council's mission declared, people in both Khartoum and N'Djamena must distance themselves from the armed rebel groups. That is the only way to establish trust between the parties.

My delegation believes it crucial to make progress in all those areas in order that the efforts to relaunch the Darfur peace process can produce results. We therefore once again reiterate our confidence in the Secretary-General, Jan Eliasson and Salim Ahmed Salim.

Mr. Kafando (Burkina Faso) (*spoke in French*): I too would like to thank the two Special Envoys, Mr. Jan Eliasson and Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, for their respective statements, which have given us an overview of the current situation in Darfur, especially as regards the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). I would also like to congratulate them and to assure them of our full support in the great efforts they are making to ensure that UNAMID is at last effective and to restore peace to Darfur.

The recent mission of the Security Council to Sudan allowed us to see the reality on the ground at first-hand, to fully assess the scope of the challenges facing UNAMID and, above all, to hear the expectations of the civilian population as regards

security and stability. What we saw there, especially in camps for refugees and displaced persons, was fully in line with the statements we have just heard. The continuation of violence serves to remind us of the urgency of finding a way out of the crisis. We have taken note of the assurances given by the Sudanese Government. We reiterate our strong condemnation of all acts of violence, regardless of who the perpetrators are.

The confrontation between the Sudanese Government and various illegal armed groups, which include inter-tribal and inter-factional groups, is exacerbating the humanitarian and security situation in Darfur, thereby endangering the political dialogue currently under way. That situation of insecurity — which also affects humanitarian workers and UNAMID personnel, who are also victims — serves to limit access in providing humanitarian assistance to the vulnerable civilian population.

Burkina Faso believes that the lack of genuine political will by the parties to engage in substantive negotiations, in particular on the part of various illegal armed groups, is the major obstacle to resolving the crisis. The Security Council must therefore call upon all parties to agree to the principle of peace. In that regard, we welcome the decision of the Secretary-General to soon appoint a joint chief mediator to begin negotiations as quickly as possible.

With regard to the deployment of UNAMID, as several speakers before me have emphasized, along with senior UNAMID officials, we have taken into account the difficulties and constraints facing the deployment of the Operation.

There is a lack of infrastructure for the operation, a lack of engineering capacity, difficulties in transporting equipment, lack of security, et cetera. Solutions to these problems must be found as soon as possible, lest UNAMID be endangered.

We are gratified by the Sudanese Government's willingness to work for the effective deployment of UNAMID, and we take note of its hope that some of the mission's concerns can be resolved in collaboration with the competent Sudanese authorities. It is a fact that UNAMID needs vigorous, concrete and substantial support if it is to be fully operational in the near future. The Security Council has a central role to play in that regard.

We thank the countries that are providing support to the mission and at the same time appeal to all partners to contribute to eliminating the obstacles that continue to hamper the deployment of the force. We are confident that the commitment of all States Members of the United Nations, and of Security Council members in particular, will make it possible to resolve these logistical issues.

As many have noted, the search for a lasting solution to the Darfur crisis hinges on a regional approach, specifically the normalization of diplomatic relations between Chad and the Sudan. Here, we urge those two countries to begin constructive political dialogue and to resume the meetings of the contact group supporting the implementation of the Dakar Agreement, without forgetting, of course, the African Union mediation. We believe that on that basis it will be possible to build lasting peace and stability in Darfur and throughout the subregion.

Mr. Spatafora (Italy): I warmly welcome Special Envoys Jan Eliasson and Salim Ahmed Salim back to New York, and I thank them for the very lucid briefings, as well as for their tireless efforts to achieve peace in Darfur. In fact, what we have seen today is a very disturbing and gloomy picture — indeed, the word “gloomy” was used by Mr. Salim. And as Special Envoy Eliasson put it, “this intractable conflict is still unfolding” (*supra*).

We understand that there is frustration and fatigue there. I think that we have to prevent frustration and fatigue from overcoming us in the Security Council as well. We have to react, and we have to prevent. Like others, we regret that despite all the efforts there has been no real progress in the political process for Darfur since the Addis Ababa conclusions of November 2006. Since the various tracks — political, security and peacekeeping, humanitarian, rule of law and impunity — are interrelated and mutually reinforcing, lack of progress in one has a negative impact on the others. Breaking this vicious circle should be our priority. In this we will require a higher degree of cohesion and unity among Security Council members.

I wonder also whether what Mr. Salim said was exactly the right point, that there is “a need to rethink the strategy on the way forward” (*supra*). I will come back to that. Is it a question of rethinking the strategy or is it a question of shortcomings in the delivery of the strategy that we have. We will have to think about that.

Of course, I think that any new strategy has to remain within the six milestones described by Ambassador Eliasson. I shall not elaborate on this, as Ambassador Sawers has already done so and I fully agree with what he said. Whatever our strategy, it must remain within those milestones. Of course, as Ambassador Kumalo said, we have to be sure that all the pieces are in place; we must not be selecting, picking and choosing here and there. What I am not so sure about is whether I can agree with Ambassador Kumalo when he says that we have to be humble enough, when we hear the appeals for help, to say that we are not in a position to help. I do not know if I would be comfortable with that. Yes, there is frustration and fatigue, but what is important is that there is still hope. I think we must not remove the oxygen from that hope. If we give the perception that for the moment we cannot help, that hope might fade, which I would not like to see. It is our responsibility not to betray the small hope that, one hopes, remains, and we must ensure that there is follow up.

The Security Council has been limited in its action on Darfur by a sort of hesitation to openly and resolutely address each problem on its own terms. Too often we around this table have been constrained by the self-imposed attitude that we must be comprehensive at all costs. We have not been strong enough in addressing the Government’s responsibilities regarding UNAMID or the protection of civilians because of the Government’s valid concerns with respect to the political process. At the same time, we have refrained from using all the means at our disposal to persuade the rebel movements to join the peace process, because we did not want the Government to see this as a reward for its behaviour.

The result of the situation is there for everybody to see. I think we should honestly assess our performance and renew our collective capacity to address each track of the Darfur crisis with the same determination, but with the necessary individual focus.

Italy sees merit in the proposal mentioned by Special Envoy Salim of a high-level meeting on Darfur, put forward during the recent informal consultations held in Geneva on 4 and 5 June. However, the meeting would have to be well prepared in advance. What is needed now is leadership, direction and a new strategy, not just brainstorming. The time for brainstorming has passed. As I said before, we should also be clear on whether we want to adapt our strategy

or to improve its delivery. But the idea is worth studying, and my delegation is ready to engage in any further work on it.

I would also like to support what was said by the Special Envoys about the crucial need to ensure the participation of civil society. This is particularly important in a situation in which, because of the fragmentation of the rebel movements, on which Ambassador Eliasson has put the accent, it is difficult to understand who is representing whom. The representation issue is particularly serious ahead of next year's national elections. Italy has in fact chosen to direct much of its aid to Darfur to civil society, most recently through a contribution of \$3 million to the Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund.

Finally, Mr. President, thanks to your delegation we had the privilege last week of hearing important representatives of broader public opinion, who reminded us of the reality of the conflict and of what is expected of the Security Council.

Following that meeting, I am even more convinced that the worst thing we can do is to become accustomed to the lack of progress and give in to the sense of frustration and fatigue that I mentioned earlier. We must accept responsibility, individually and collectively, for resolving the crisis and not let this sense of fatigue prevail, both for the sake of the people of Darfur and for the sake of the credibility of the United Nations.

Mr. Natalegawa (Indonesia): I join other Security Council members in welcoming once again the Special Envoys, Mr. Jan Eliasson and Mr. Salim Salim, to the Council. I wish to express my delegation's gratitude to them for their service to peace in Darfur.

The situation in Darfur today is dire, as the Security Council witnessed for itself when visiting the region earlier this month. It is indeed deeply troubling that the Darfur conflict has intensified, that the humanitarian situation has worsened and that the political process has faltered. More than that, however, it is disconcerting that all of this has taken place since the adoption of resolution 1769 (2007) last July and the initiation of the Sirte political process last October.

My delegation remains convinced that the attainment of political reconciliation and agreement has to be at the centre of the settlement of the Darfur

crisis by addressing the root causes of the conflict rather than its symptoms. Peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, and courts of justice can and must complement the political process and perhaps even create the conditions for it, but they cannot be a substitute for it.

We commend the sustained and untiring efforts and hard work of the Special Envoys and the Joint Mediation Support Team. The appointment of an African Union/United Nations joint mediator after the necessary consultations is essential.

My delegation believes that the Security Council, for its part, needs to give greater focus and attention to the political process and to take action as necessary to support the process. The Security Council, together with the Secretary-General, also needs to review the United Nations strategy for Darfur and to identify improvements that could be made. We believe that members of the international community who could prevail upon the rebels have the responsibility to do so. We fully agree with an approach that involves putting pressure on them, as others have mentioned. We also appreciate the potential contribution that the normalization of relations between the Sudan and Chad can make in promoting agreement and reconciliation in Darfur.

Ultimately, however, it is for the parties themselves to come to the table and to achieve a political agreement. They need to understand the unique support of the international community in this endeavour. It is not often that the international community lends its support and helps rebel groups to unify in negotiations with a Government. Therefore, the international community needs to be assured that this course of action remains the most viable one to pursue.

The security situation is increasingly worrying and increasingly compounding the humanitarian situation. We are deeply concerned by reports of humanitarian organizations reducing their operations as a result of the security situation.

In spite of the less than ambitious political process, the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) must take place as scheduled, in order to help, among other things, to strengthen security and protect civilians. The Secretary-General noted in his latest report on UNAMID (S/2008/400) that the security situation has

deteriorated throughout Darfur; that significant clashes have continued between tribal groups, between rebel movements and between rebel movements and the Government and its affiliated forces; and that acts of banditry have continued to increase, with attacks against UNAMID and humanitarian personnel. In spite of these difficulties, we need to do all we can to help the people of Darfur.

It is clear that UNAMID's deployment needs to be accelerated as much as possible. There are real hurdles to overcome, not least those related to infrastructure and logistics. In this regard, we urge closer cooperation, coordination and consultation between the Secretariat and UNAMID headquarters on the one hand and the Sudanese authorities on the other.

A military solution is not possible in Darfur; otherwise we would not be discussing the Darfur situation today. All the parties should cease all hostilities even though they have yet to exhaust their energy. That energy should be directed to the negotiating table rather than the battle front. Once again, for us, the political process is key. The plight and the future of the civilian population should be reason enough to re-engage the political process.

Mr. Grauls (Belgium) (*spoke in French*): I would like to thank the Special Envoys, Mr. Salim and Mr. Eliasson, for their presentations. I would like to thank them also for their tireless efforts over the past 18 months. We would like them to know that Belgium has very much appreciated their commitment.

The briefings that we have just heard confirmed once again how much the political process in Darfur is deadlocked and how tragic the humanitarian situation remains. I would like to focus my statement on a few points.

The parties' lack of political will to engage a negotiating process shows that the international community must review its overall strategy for the region. Even more so than in the past, the international community must in the future provide its political support to the mediation efforts and bring influence to bear on the parties to get them to change their behaviour.

In that context, it seems to us that the idea of a high-level meeting to be convened by the Secretary-General and the African Union presidency should undoubtedly be reactivated, and I think the two Envoys

were quite right to offer this proposal. That meeting should obviously be very well prepared, but in our opinion it could make a difference.

The Security Council has remained — let us be honest about this — silent for far too long with regard to the absence of progress. It is time for us to call clearly on the parties to act responsibly. We also need to think seriously about adopting new measures against those who are standing in the way of peace, and to see how we can positively influence the parties who are showing goodwill.

We also welcome the imminent appointment of a joint mediator. We need to find a mechanism to give that mediator the necessary support and political direction.

I wish to express Belgium's extreme concern with regard to the recent deadlock in relations between the Sudan and Chad, a deadlock to which Mr. Eliasson and Mr. Salim alluded. We very much regret the cross-support to rebel movement on both sides of the border. We call upon the Sudan and Chad to respect both the spirit and the letter of the Dakar Agreement. They must work with countries of the region and international partners that are part of the contact group in order to normalize their bilateral relations as soon as possible.

The Council has mandated a hybrid mission that is expensive and complex in order to protect civilians in Darfur. This international commitment makes it even more inadmissible that the parties to the Darfur conflict continue the violence, leading to an increase in the number of displaced persons and other victims. As the Secretary-General has said, no matter how many troops or how much equipment a peacekeeping mission has, it cannot truly exercise its mandate in the midst of open hostilities directed against the civilians it is supposed to protect.

Given the impasse in the political process, I would like to recall the importance of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). It is the basis for any solution to the situation in Darfur. In that context, we welcome the road map concluded between the CPA parties on 8 June to finally resolve the problem of Abyei, and we call upon the parties to implement the road map forthwith.

I would not want to conclude without once again stressing a major priority of my delegation: the fight against impunity in Darfur. The Sudan has a dual

obligation in this respect — to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in accordance with resolution 1593 (2005) and to work to implement the sanctions imposed by the Security Council. Last week, the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/21) reminding the Sudan of its obligation to cooperate with the International Criminal Court, including with respect to the arrest warrants with regard to two individuals, one of whom is now a Minister in the Government of the Sudan. It is essential that the Security Council persevere in this approach and that, whenever necessary, it remind the Sudan of its obligations under that resolution.

Mr. Hoang Chi Trung (Viet Nam): First of all, like others, I wish to thank Mr. Jan Eliasson, the United Nations Special Envoy, and Mr. Salim Salim, the African Union (AU) Special Envoy on Darfur, for their respective presentations to the Council this morning.

Viet Nam shares the Secretary-General's concerns about the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Darfur, where tens of thousands of people continue to be homeless, to live in dire conditions and to fall victim to various violent acts. We condemn all acts of violence against civilians and humanitarian aid workers. My delegation is also deeply concerned over the worsening security and humanitarian situation in Darfur. Military actions have further complicated the situation and the political process. We call on the parties concerned to exercise the utmost restraint and to cease military and violent activities. We urge the rebel groups, in particular those that have not signed the peace agreement, to renounce the use of force and to engage in the peace process, with a view to reaching a comprehensive solution ensuring the legitimate interests of all parties concerned.

My delegation highly commends the activities of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), especially under such difficult circumstances on the ground, where the force has not been enhanced in terms of either manpower or equipment. The deployment of UNAMID on time and in full capacity in accordance with resolution 1769 (2007) is extremely important to promote the political process and to improve the humanitarian and security situation in the region. Member States should fulfil their committed contributions to UNAMID promptly so that the force can fulfil its mandate. My country highly values the roles played by the United Nations and the

African Union, and strongly supports the efforts made by the Secretary-General and the United Nations and African Union Special Envoys, Mr. Jan Eliasson and Mr. Salim Salim, in promoting the peace process in Darfur. We also support the appointment of a United Nations-AU joint chief mediator, who will assist the work of the Special Envoys and promote the peace process.

Finally, we note with profound regret the recent events taking place in the border area between Chad and the Sudan, which have strained bilateral relations and complicated the regional situation. Viet Nam wishes to call upon the Governments of both Chad and the Sudan to exercise the utmost restraint and to comply with the provisions of the Dakar Accord, particularly to resolve the conflicts through peaceful negotiations.

Mr. Vilović (Croatia): First of all, like other members I would like to extend our thanks to the Special Envoys, Mr. Jan Eliasson and Mr. Salim Salim, not only for today's briefings, but also for the work they have been carrying out over the past 18 months. We would like to extend our strong support for their work.

We express our deep frustration that the situation in Darfur and other parts of the Sudan deteriorated further during the reporting period. Not only did the security and humanitarian situation, which was very bad some months ago, deteriorate further, but the political process, despite the ongoing mediation efforts, stalled, and there is clearly no political will among the parties to cease hostilities and pursue substantive negotiations. What is more, some parties possess no political will to pursue a political solution to the situation.

In that regard, we affirm the central role of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). We welcome the announced appointment of a joint chief mediator and express our deep hope that this would be a step forward in the direction of getting all sides together at the negotiating table. There is always obviously a clear link between security situations, political processes and humanitarian situations. That is so in Darfur as well. The experience of our recent visit to Darfur makes it clear that security is a precondition for all other processes. We have seen the situation on the ground; we have talked to the people in the camps for refugees

and internally displaced persons, and obviously there is a feeling of despair, which is caused primarily by security concerns, which are extremely grave.

One of the facets of the security element is, of course, respect for and implementation of the arms embargo. There is obviously a need to cut the free flow of arms throughout the Sudan and throughout the region. The arms embargo should be fully respected by all actors.

The deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), as has already been mentioned today — and before — is slow. Even the targeted figure of 80 per cent by the end of the year is not satisfactory. It is not only an issue of the pace of the deployment, but also an issue of equipment. That is also where we are facing problems. During the visit, it was stressed — at least this was my understanding — that the crucial issue is that of helicopters. It should be part of our responsibility to try not only to ensure that deployment is on time, but also to get the equipment delivered on time.

It was mentioned that another precondition is the normalization of relations between the Sudan and Chad. We saw how this issue influences not only the whole political process, but also the concrete security and humanitarian situation on the ground. Today, in the briefings and in our discussion, it was stressed that, all stakeholders should be involved in the future political process, which means not only the Government and not only the movements, but also the representatives of civil society and traditional leaders. We think that that direction is the only possible one. We saw on the ground how important that structure, that portion of society is.

We also welcome the announcement regarding the convening of a high-level meeting, but we stress that this meeting, as has already been noted today, must be well prepared. I believe it was the Italian representative who said that we have no time for brainstorming sessions, we must really have well-prepared high-level meetings.

Allow me to say that, while Darfur should remain in our focus, there are other very pressing points that should not be overlooked. The north-south conflict continues to affect large numbers of people as well, as recently demonstrated by the tragic events in Abyei. Therefore, the continued implementation of the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement is relevant and necessary.

Finally, allow me to stress a point that has been raised already. It has been said that there are no confidence-building measures on the ground, that there is an obvious lack of them. In our opinion, one of the key elements in such confidence-building measures is the issue of impunity, an issue that was stressed during our visit. We saw that bringing those responsible for crimes to justice would contribute greatly to public support for confidence-building measures. In our talks on the subject with officials in Khartoum, we stressed our conviction that all sides must cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court and implement the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Mr. Dolgov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We too are grateful to the Special Envoys of the Secretary-General and of the African Union, Jan Eliasson and Salim Ahmed Salim, for their substantive briefings on ways to move the Darfur political process forward in order to ensure an effective settlement of the crisis there. The analysis provided by the Special Envoys reaffirms that international efforts on a Darfur settlement, in particular through the Security Council, must be focused on maintaining a maximally inclusive negotiating process among the sides in Darfur under the aegis of the United Nations and the African Union.

In our view, resuming political contacts between the Government and the Darfur opposition in order to achieve speedy agreements on the cessation of hostilities is of the highest priority. Moving forward the political process would unquestionably promote a strengthening of security in Darfur. It would also allow for the speeding up of the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The lack of such consistent progress on a political settlement makes the efforts undertaken, including peacekeeping efforts, ineffective as regards a long-term solution to the crisis in Darfur. It is obvious that the deployment of UNAMID, which indeed should be speeded up as soon as possible, in itself will not lead to a long-term solution to the crisis.

We share the views of the Special Envoys regarding the primary responsibility of the Sudanese themselves for the fate of the settlement and, in the last analysis, for the fate of the country. The obstacles on the road to a political settlement as of today are primarily being created by some of the Darfur rebel groups.

Today we have heard confirmation from the Special Envoys of the highly negative fact that there continues to be a splintering of the rebel groups. The leaders of the rebel groups are not in a position to agree upon a unified political negotiating platform. Moreover, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is openly embarking upon the path of armed struggle against the Government of the Sudan. It is also obvious that the rebels have well-developed channels for the purchase of arms and for obtaining financial assistance. There is no need to reiterate that all of the Security Council decisions on Darfur, including on the arms embargo, must be implemented fully by all parties.

We believe that, as regards the leaders of the irreconcilable rebel groups, appropriate measures must be taken, up to and including sanctions. We have listened very carefully to the views presented by Ambassador Kumalo of South Africa, and we share those views. We also express our hope that the appointment by the Secretary-General of a joint mediator for the political process in Darfur, which we expect very soon, will provide a substantive impetus for the resumption of negotiations among the Darfur sides.

Naturally, we welcome the great contribution of the Special Envoys, Mr. Eliasson and Mr. Salim, to the cause of re-establishing peace and normal life in Darfur. Their experience and knowledge will undoubtedly be required in the future as well.

We fully support and share the argument of the Secretary-General regarding the indivisibility of peace in Sudan. Progress on a settlement for the south of Sudan will determine to a significant extent progress in resolving the conflict in Darfur. We welcome, in that connection, the recent agreements on the settlement of the problem in Abyei, and we are counting on the fact that those agreements will be fully implemented by both parties. The Security Council recently had an opportunity to take a stand on that issue, and we remain devoted to that stand.

What is also of the greatest importance is the normalization of bilateral relations between Sudan and Chad. Once again, I would like to state that we share the views of the Special Envoys on that subject. We agree with their conclusions with regard to the significance of the regional dimension in resolving the problems of Sudan and also of the importance, for the stability of the entire African continent, of preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Sudan.

Mr. Urbina (Costa Rica) (*spoke in Spanish*): I was recently able to speak with the President of Côte d'Ivoire, President Gbagbo, and I told him that my country, as a nation of Latin America, did not have any strategic involvement in Africa. When we examine African realities, we try to do so in a spirit of good faith and we truly try to make a contribution to the peace processes in the region.

It is with that same attitude that we approach the issue of Sudan and the region. We have advocated many times in this Council for a regional approach. There are bandits such as Joseph Kony skipping around from one country to another in the region to elude his pursuers. Today the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) is searching for him, tomorrow it could be the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) or the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Everyone is after him, but our efforts remain disjointed. Today we have heard the Special Envoys state that the problems in the region are really one problem. The international community must first deal with this entire, singular problem in all its complexity.

I should briefly like to emphasize the need for the Government of the Sudan to provide certain conditions that seem to us fundamental: working conditions for the United Nations missions, security for the missions and security for humanitarian workers. When we talked with representatives of humanitarian organizations in Darfur — and with the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) itself — they told us about the loss of almost \$2 million in vehicles and equipment. Humanitarian organizations told us about the lives lost and the times they were attacked. They also told us about the restrictions on movement imposed on them and how it was impossible to go about in rented vehicles beyond certain areas. In other words, there are too many restrictions. I believe that primary responsibility falls on the Government of the Sudan, which must have a more open attitude towards the international community.

In Friendship Hall, we 15 ambassadors heard presidential adviser Mr. Nafi Ali Nafi speak without hesitation about his Government's major concerns and reservations with regard to United Nations actions. Listening to and reading the reports of the Special Envoys, I am now struck by their assessment of the internal divisions within the various movements and

their will, or lack thereof, to participate. I truly understand what they have both said. I feel that their reports contain little assessment of the attitude of the Government of the Sudan. As understandable as that may be, it nevertheless seems to me that the Council can hardly act consistently without a fairly clear picture of the Government of the Sudan's attitude with regard to the efforts of the United Nations.

It is worth recalling that the United Nations will spend \$2.3 to \$2.4 billion in the Sudan this year. As the representative of a country that does not have strategic interests in the region, I genuinely feel that this is a Government with deep distrust of the actions of the United Nations. It is a Government that ignores the resolutions adopted by the Security Council under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. It is a Government that does not make any link between peace and justice. It is a Government that, with a certain degree of insolence, continues to keep Mr. Ahmad Harun as its Minister for Humanitarian Affairs and has not brought to justice Mr. Ali Kushayb, a well-known member of the Janjaweed who is also the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court. One therefore legitimately wonders about the meaning of such action.

I agree with Mr. Eliasson and Mr. Salim that it is necessary to achieve consistency at the various levels of action. I believe there needs to be consistency in the international community and in regional efforts. We have not achieved that yet, but those are areas in which we can continue to work. I believe that achieving consistency in international efforts vis-à-vis the Government of the Sudan is an enormous task at the moment. We must approach it positively and in a spirit of cooperation and of making a contribution and building confidence. In that connection, we welcome the idea of a joint mediator. We are certain that, along with the work of the two Special Envoys, that should contribute to creating trust between the United Nations and the Government of the Sudan. Such understanding is absolutely essential. If we can achieve it, I am sure that the movements, militias and groups disrupting the peace in Darfur and the Sudan can see their problems resolved.

Do forgive me, Mr. President, for deviating from my written statement. Having listened to my colleagues and the Special Envoys, my delegation and I would be very grateful if the Special Envoys, if they deem it appropriate, could give the Council an assessment of how they feel about the Government of the Sudan.

Mr. Arias (Panama) (*spoke in Spanish*): First of all, allow me to thank Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim and my great friend former General Assembly President Eliasson for their briefings. I would also like to convey to them the gratitude of the Republic of Panama for their tireless efforts and personal dedication to this difficult task. We hope they will continue to work as vigorously as they have in the past.

There are currently three closely interlinked socio-political processes under way in the Sudan that involve the Security Council. These are the peace process; the deployment and operationalization of the Hybrid Operation; and the decision of the Council to refer the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court. None of those processes is making the appropriate progress expected. As pointed out by Mr. Eliasson and Mr. Salim, the failure of the peace process is in large part due to the failure, both on the part of the Khartoum Government and certain rebel groups, to decide to begin a political dialogue. Moreover, some of the rebel groups are being supported by influential members of the international community from within and outside the region.

With regard to the deployment of the Hybrid Operation, despite a small amount of progress, there is a clear lack of cooperation on the part of the Khartoum Government. In addition, despite significant efforts in that regard by the Organization, including the Security Council and the Secretariat, the United Nations has not been able to put together the necessary troops and equipment to allow the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur to carry out its mandate.

With regard to the decision of the Council to refer the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court, the Court has carried out the task given to it. Nevertheless, the Council has not provided the support that decision merits. In that connection, I cannot fail to refer to the words of President Kabila as cited here by Ambassador Sawers:

(*spoke in English*)

“... one cannot put justice aside and hope for a durable peace ...” (*supra*).

(*spoke in Spanish*)

If we add to the foregoing the repeated breakdown of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement — as recently reflected in the reprehensible destruction of the town of Abyei — and the conflict between the

Governments of the Sudan and Chad, we cannot but conclude that, despite the words of Ambassador Spatafora, we are facing a fairly hopeless situation. Given that situation, we cannot hope to overcome the violence in Darfur and in the Sudan in general unless the Council and all Members of the United Nations act differently and in greater conformity with the decisions of the Council. As Mr. Eliasson has said, that will require that we provide incentives and disincentives to the parties to the conflict. As the Permanent Representative of Libya said, it will require more active participation by civil society and traditional leaders. And as the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom said, it will require strengthening the current sanctions, especially the arms embargo, and the imposition of new sanctions if necessary.

The President: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the United States.

Many points have been made, and the discussion has gone on for a while. I shall therefore be brief and will make just a few points.

First of all, I want to thank the two Special Envoys for their service and for their briefings today. They have described well the situation and the challenges that we face. They have challenged the Security Council; now, the ball is in our court as to what to do in the face of what they have described. I would like to emphasize a few points drawn from their briefings and to speak of what we need to do.

Secondly, the situation could, of course, get worse. Therefore, the first task for us is to determine what we can do to avoid that. Certainly, if the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is not implemented — if the North-South agreement falls apart — the situation in the Sudan could get a lot worse. Therefore, it is very important that we remain attentive to the implementation of the CPA. Right after this meeting, the Council will issue a presidential statement with regard to Abyei; that should send the good message that the Council remains engaged and focused on the issue of the CPA. That has to be a continuing preoccupation of ours in the coming period.

The third point I would like to make is with regard to the security situation. I think it is clear, at least to me and to my delegation, that that is fundamental: without security — or improved security, as we will not be able to have perfect security for some time to come — everything is at risk. I do not think

you can have much political progress in an environment where there is the current degree of insecurity. I will come to the political track later, but we know that there are many sources of insecurity. Addressing all of them simultaneously is also a considerable challenge. There are internal factors and external, regional, factors that affect the security situation.

One thing that is a very important help with regard to security is the deployment of an effective African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The Council has expressed itself unanimously on this issue. Unfortunately, the deployment has not taken place as expected in terms of speed and the effectiveness of the force. There are challenges that we need to address and that we need to be more attentive to, in our view. One of these is to make sure that we are attentive to the Secretariat: that the United Nations and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations do what they need to do. Several colleagues spoke about the logistics requirement, which needs to be addressed. There are resources available: money that has been dedicated to this effort. But I think that this has been rather slow. The United Nations — the Secretariat — can and should do more, and we need to be more attentive in order to make sure that our intent is well understood and that all possible speed that can be generated is indeed generated.

Also, I think frankly that we have not been tough enough with the Government of Sudan. I think it has been, shall we say, dragging its feet with regard to the implementation of an effective force, and colleagues have not been prepared to incentivize that Government appropriately. I think we need to look at what we can do and what should be done to make sure that an effective force is in place. Sometimes, the willingness of the Government to negotiate on the political track is being used as a shield to avoid pressuring it on these other things as much as it needs to be pressured. I think that to deal with this problem we need to focus on this.

The third point is the issue of getting the right capabilities there. All of us need to redouble our efforts to get the international community to ensure that the capabilities are made available, whether it be heavy-lift or medium-lift capacity or helicopters. For our part, the United States, of course, is spending about \$100 million to get African forces — 6,000 of them at least — to the level of capability where they can be

deployed there as quickly as possible. I think we could be more focused in order to encourage the deployment or availability of appropriate assets.

Also, I think one factor that affects the situation is the arms in the area. We need to look at the situation with regard to the embargo — several colleagues have raised this — and see whether the embargo is being implemented effectively or not.

I will briefly touch on the fourth point, on the political process. It is obviously very important. Ultimately, without it there cannot be peace in Darfur or in Sudan. The challenges have been outlined very well: the fragmentation of the rebel movements; the disagreements among rebel groups; the Government policies, not only with regard to Darfur — although it has been willing to negotiate — but also, as mentioned, its policies relating to the CPA; and the regional rivalries that exist. All of that makes this difficult. We have to look at whether there are ways in which we could incentivize the parties to move. What can each of us do, or what can we — or some subset of us — do together to do better?

We welcome the imminent appointment of a chief mediator. Ambassador Kumalo said we should pray for him; we will do more than that: we will pray for him and we will cooperate with him as well. I know that he will face a serious challenge, and for him to succeed we need to see how to incentivize the various parties.

In my view, we would be mistaken to expect a lot from the political track in the short term, given the difficulties that exist. Therefore, I think that the short-term focus needs to be more on the security track: to improve the security environment by having more capable forces there.

My last point is that I think that the situation — which some colleagues have described as gloomy or difficult — could lead one to be fatigued and perhaps to say that there is not much we can do about it and that we have to learn to live with the situation. I think that would be a mistake. I think it is important to restate that this is an important situation with huge implications, not only in political and security terms, as was described very ably by the two Special Envoys, but also in terms of the terrible humanitarian situation. It therefore needs to remain a focus of our efforts. Certainly, it is for my Government. But also, we have to recognize that our own credibility, as the Security Council, is at stake here, given the resolutions we have

adopted and the resources that are being spent and that there is a willingness to spend.

What we need to do is to adjust our approach, to be more effective than we have been, because there is certainly a big gap between where we want to be and where we are. Thus, I think that the two Special Envoys have provided us with some issues to consider — and to consider seriously. Again, I want to thank them for their service and for their briefings today. My country holds both of them in high regard.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

I now give the floor to Mr. Eliasson to respond to comments and questions raised.

Mr. Eliasson: I thank the members of the Security Council for their very constructive and productive remarks, and also for the strong support they have expressed for our work. I think we have identified certain directions in which we should go in the future.

I am pleased that members referred to the six points that I mentioned in my presentation. As to one of those points, namely the north-south relationship to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), I would like to provide members with some additional information. This relationship is crucial for Darfur and, of course, for Sudan as a whole.

As to the terms of reference of the new joint chief mediator, a role whose creation we have proposed for a long time, we would recommend that he take into consideration the regional and national dimensions of the issues. Those criteria were not contained in our terms of reference, but we hope that, in the light of this discussion, it is seen as a constructive step forward. In a way, the mandate has been widened, not in a formal manner that will require the mediator to deal in detail with these issues, but one simply cannot deal with Darfur without taking into consideration the relationship with Chad, for instance, and the relationship to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Another aspect that I would like to mention, in response to the question posed by my friend Mr. Kumalo, is the issue of incentives and disincentives as well as action taken or pressures brought to bear by the Security Council. This is a difficult question for Salim and me to answer. We are in the business of mediation, of bringing the parties

together. We try to present a fair report on the situation, but then it is the role of the Security Council to draw conclusions from our reports. I must say, however, that in the course of our talks it has been helpful to know and to remind the parties that the Council has to take certain measures and has certain tools to use. I remember in particular the presidential statement that the Council issued on 24 October 2007, where it was stated that parties — including, of course, both the Government and the movements — that obstruct the political process, the peacekeeping operation or the humanitarian operations, will be subject to measures from the Security Council. At times, Salim and I reminded the parties of the Council's action and it certainly had an effect. I think similar discussions should take place at present.

I think it is important that members look both at incentives and disincentives. Talks have to be an attractive option for the movements as well. Here, I believe the Government has a particular role to play, not only as the party with the resources and responsibilities for the security and prosperity of the nation, but also as the party that could deliver at least some constructive ideas on power-sharing, wealth-sharing and security.

The movements are constantly asking about compensation for the horrible years of 2003 to 2005 and are asking for the disarmament of the Janjaweed militias. We are asking the Government to send signals of a more concrete nature so that the incentives are also coming from the Government side. I believe it important that there be a new reminder from the Council, similar to the message contained in the 24 October presidential statement, which emanates from Council's latest consideration of the issues.

I was asked whether the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) had a national agenda. Yes, it does have a national agenda, and I think that that is one of the reasons why the Government reacts more strongly vis-à-vis JEM than with respect other movements, apart from the fact, of course, that there was an offensive attack against Umdurman in the neighbourhood of Khartoum only a few weeks ago.

I would claim that we should probably continue to encourage a process for talks or dialogue with the JEM. The Government is now aiming to put JEM on terrorists lists and the like. That is not something with which we as mediators will become involved. But I

believe it to be important that channels of communication also be extended to the JEM in line with the conclusion that we usually reach in conflicts around the world, namely, that in the end one has to speak to one's enemy, one has to speak to the parties relevant for the ending of the conflict.

The issue of impunity was raised. This is not, again, part of our negotiation mandate, but I still wish to repeat one point I made during my presentation, which places impunity in a larger context. Respect for human rights and the rule of law is crucial for trust to be established, for a credible political process to be made possible and for reconciliation to occur. We made that point in our general perspective where I believed it to be appropriate.

My last point is related to the Council President's very good summary of today's discussion. I believe it to be important for us not to fall into despair and passivity. On the contrary, with the situation reaching such a serious level and the margins being so thin out there — we have been in the field, we have seen women crying out for water, we have seen kids dying more or less in front of us, we have seen the despair in the eyes of the people — I think it is now extremely important that we take a realistic approach, both in the short-term and in the long-term. I believe the short-term perspective should be that everyone should feel a responsibility to make sure that we do not have an escalation of hostilities, in fact, that we take steps in the direction of a cessation of hostilities, and that we are extremely sharp with everyone or anyone who goes down the military road.

There is no military solution to the problems in Darfur. We have to prove that point, and I believe we have to make that point not only as mediators or as the Security Council or as the African Union Peace and Security Council, but also all of us individually, representing nations that, for example, in your case, Mr. President, sit on this extremely powerful body responsible for international peace and security.

So I believe we also need to mobilize our individual countries' leverage and influence. Only if we do this, only if we show that there is a solid front in denouncing insecurity and stopping escalation, that we can now make a contribution. By that, as you, Sir, just said, we can create the environment in which we can then take the steps more in the medium-term, but as soon as possible, for a credible political process. I

think that that is an agenda. It is not driving us into hopelessness; rather, it is a realistic approach. Let us deal with security and then take the step to a credible political process.

With those remarks, I thank the Council for calling this meeting and giving us the opportunity to have a discussion in such an open and transparent fashion as we have done today.

The President: I thank Mr. Eliasson for the clarifications and responses that he has provided.

I now give the floor to Mr. Salim to respond to comments and questions raised.

Mr. Salim: Like my colleague, I would also like to thank the Council for the opportunity given us, and also for the serious attention with which the Council has been addressing this issue. I shall also be very brief in answering the specific issues that were raised, in particular the link between the political process and the issue of security.

Ideally, we would obtain an agreement, and then life would become much more comfortable for everybody, especially for the peacekeepers. But that is the ideal. The reality on the ground is that there is no such agreement. The reality on the ground is that unless you address the issue of security the political process becomes impossible.

Wherever we went, whatever we discussed, whether it was with the representatives of the internally displaced persons or the representatives of civil society, whether it was in areas I covered in my statement, in Government areas or in areas controlled by the rebels, everybody has been talking about security, security, security. So the issue of security becomes important. Therefore, the question of the rapid deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) becomes important.

I want to say one more thing on this point. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was there, and it did a lot under very, very difficult circumstances. But AMIS began to lose credibility because it did not have the required resources and the required equipment. Now there is a danger that if nothing is done to really beef up UNAMID, it will face same problems that AMIS had. I talked earlier about the euphoria of expectations. When we were in Darfur everybody was waiting for UNAMID. Everybody was

talking about how important it was to have UNAMID. But the minute they begin to see that, really, the difference between UNAMID and AMIS is very small, there will be a problem. So I think that it is in the interest, not only of the peace process, but also for the credibility of the Security Council, that this question is addressed in an effective manner.

The engagement of civil society, I think, is a must, and as Jan has pointed out, initially, both the Government and the movements were totally opposed to any idea of involvement with civil society. Now we have begun to see some change. As he said, the Government of the Sudan has told us clearly that they are supportive of the idea of civil society. But in the final analysis, you have got to involve these people, because neither the Government nor the movements can claim to have exclusive representation of the people of Darfur. There are people, whether traditional leaders or civil society organizations, who want peace. One thing that comes out in this situation is that the people in Darfur want peace. Irrespective of their political affiliation, irrespective of where they are located, they want peace.

On the question of incentives and disincentives, I think my friend Jan has responded rightly. He used the words "incentives and disincentives". If you go through my speech, you will see that I used the phrase "encourage or discourage". But basically what we are saying is that the Council must be in a position to do something. I would humbly caution against repeated warnings which have no follow-up action, warnings like "if you do this, something will happen; if you do not do that, something else will happen". And nothing happens. Then not only is the credibility of the Council is at stake, but even the capacity of those who are involved in the peace process becomes somewhat impaired. So I would say that, yes, there is a need for encouragement or incentives, and there is a need also for discouragement or disincentives.

On the question of inclusion, I think that inclusion is very important, as Jan said also. We know the position of the Government of the Sudan. We know how they feel after the attack on Omdurman. But the response of the international community has been swift. Going beyond that, one cannot say that a given party should be excluded. I think that it should be the movement itself which excludes itself from the process. You should not start excluding people from the negotiations, especially a movement which has

some degree of support — although I understand full well, as was rightly explained, that there is a feeling that JEM's agenda goes beyond Darfur.

In specific response to the representative of Costa Rica, I will say this: In both of our statements, we have made it very clear that primary responsibility for the situation in Darfur must be that of the Government of the Sudan. There are areas where the Government of the Sudan has not responded regarding what we expect them to do. For example, every time that we have gone to Khartoum, we have repeatedly appealed for the non-utilization of aerial bombardment. We have said very clearly that there should be a proportionate response. What do we mean by this? If there is an attack, for example, like JEM's attack, it is logical for the Government of the Sudan to exercise self-defence. However, when one uses air power and the air power affects not only the movements but also ordinary civilians, then there is a problem. That is why we have been insisting on that.

Secondly, at this point in time, when it comes to negotiations, it is very difficult to hold the Government of the Sudan responsible, because they say all the time that they are ready for negotiations. Maybe we can say that, although they say that they are ready to negotiate, perhaps in their hearts and minds they are not ready. You cannot argue on that basis; you can only argue on

the basis of what is real. I think it is important to reach a stage where the Government of the Sudan will be tested, and they can only be tested in negotiations: What is your position on power sharing? What is your position on wealth sharing? What is your position on the question of security? When we reach that stage, then we will be in a position to say whether or not the Government of the Sudan is cooperating on the question of negotiations.

Finally, after my limited experience in dealing with the Darfur question, I will say this: when we talk of incentives and disincentives, they must be universally applied. Even though, as I said, the Government of the Sudan bears primary responsibility, it would be wrong to assume that on the one hand you have all the nice guys and on the other hand you have all the bad guys. That is not true. In other words, therefore, you have to deal with the nice guys and the bad guys wherever they appear, whether they come from the Government side or the side of the movements.

The President: I thank Mr. Salim for his comments and clarifications.

There are no further speakers on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.